The Unintended Results of Payment Reform and Electronic Medical Records

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Reform of how healthcare is delivered, whether through state or federal initiatives, insurer protocols, or provider action, is proceeding rapidly and with insufficient attention to how it affects the recipients of health care. The motivation for health care reform is primarily to control health care costs, and secondarily to improve quality of care. Healthcare reform often relies heavily on financial incentives, and policy makers have repeatedly touted the efficacy of electronic health records. Financial incentives and electronic health records produce unintended results that may be detrimental to patients, and persons with psychiatric challenges in particular. This paper examines some of the pitfalls of payment reform and electronic health records.

I. Financial Incentives

Healthcare is moving away from fee-for-service and towards a system of capitation and risk sharing.¹ Experiments with financial incentive systems, such as global capitation, bonus payments, and profit-sharing, are being promoted as a means to decrease the cost of healthcare while increasing the quality of healthcare.² Individual providers or provider groups receive financial incentives for: reduction of medication costs, sometimes through the use of formularies or protocols that favor lower cost drugs; reduction of imaging and laboratory services; reduction of frequency or length of services; reduction in the recommendation or authorization of certain other types of

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¹ See Robert A. Berenson et al, *US Approaches to Physician Payment: The Deconstruction of Primary Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 613 (2010)* (outlining why fee-for-service reform is needed to support primary care in the patient-centered medical home).

services; reduction of referrals to specialists; overall reduction in practice/entity costs; increases in the number of patients seen by each clinician (panel size); increase in favorable outcomes; execution of particular processes (pay for performance); and providing lower cost equipment. Accountable Care Organizations (hereinafter “ACOs”), which have garnered much attention in recent years, use many of these financial incentives.

ACOs and other risk-bearing organizations often trill about efficiency, quality and the freedom to innovate allegedly provided by the new payment arrangements. These same proponents fail to address the practical implications of these measures for patients. These financial incentives are questionable with respect to their ability to control costs, allocation of resources, quality of care, adequacy of care, innovation in treatment, access to care, and cherry-picking of patients.

The primary driver behind payment reform is to lower costs. Although in the short-term these incentives appear to cut costs, in reality unintended health related consequences result in higher expenditures. For example, shorter hospital stays, while less costly up from expensive.

Additional explanations for the failure of health care to reduce costs include: hospitals are not expected to act in the interest of patients; providers may be more likely to engage in overutilization; and the incentives for providers may not align with those for patients.

9 See generally, Sunil E. Vemulapalli, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 Health Affairs 32 (2011) (outlining ACOs and the financial incentives to reduce Medicare costs).
10 See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
practice/entity costs; panel size); increase in performance); and organizations (hereinafter use many of these out efficiency, quality arrangements. of these measures for their ability to costs. Although in the tended health related hospital stays, while explanations for the positive results found. See Robert Coates, The New Jersey Gainsharing Experience, PHYSICIAN EXEC. J. (Jan./Feb. 2014), available at http://www.acpe.org/docs/default-source/pej-archives-2014/the-new-jersey-gainsharing-experience.pdf?sfvrsn=4. One article that reported cost savings from gainsharing incentives noted, “Many of the cost-saving measures that we used to succeed in gainsharing were expansions of programs that we had already instituted in an effort to save costs. Therefore it is hard to say to what extent the program, by itself, led to the cost savings.” Id. Gainsharing programs give doctors a financial incentive to decrease the use of specific medical devices and supplies, switch to specific products that are less expensive, or adopt certain clinical practices or protocols that reduce costs by giving them a portion of any savings attributable to the doctors’ activities. W.P. Carey Sch. of Bus., Gainsharing in Health Care: Cost-Saving Kick Start...or Kickback?, KNOWWPC (Nov. 23, 2005) http://knowwpcarey.com/article.cfm?aid=864.


9 See Palmer Evans, M.D. and Steven Hester, M.D., Addresses at the Massachusetts Health Care Forum: Accountable Health Care Delivery-Models and Policy Actions for Massachusetts (Nov. 30, 2010) available at http://masshealthpolicyforum.brandeis.edu/forums/forum-pages/AccountableHealthCareDelivery.html. Such administrative costs included “huge executive salaries, fancy office buildings, and layers of bureaucracy to micro-manage doctors and argue with providers to deny or delay payments.” Id. There is not much reason to believe that ACOs, run by corporate entities, will behave differently from HMOS. Id. Even not-for-profit HMOS exhibited the “arrogance and unaccountability, typical of large insurance companies, towards health care providers and enrollees” Id. Running an ACO requires formidable investment in technology and management to ensure that the ACO remains financially viable. Id.

10 See Samuel H. Zuvekas & Joel W. Cohen, Paying Physicians by Capitation: Is the Past Now Prologue? 9 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1661, 1664 (2010) (discussing recent history of capitation and implementation on current payment reform measures). From 1980 to 2007, “[H]MOS may also have abandoned provider capitation because of the administrative complexity of calculating and negotiating capitation rates, and because capitation might not have delivered on its premise of cost containment.” Id. See also Capitation and Risk Contracting Survey, AM. MED. GRP. ASS’N. 1, 11 (2008), http://amcp.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=11758 (last visited May 18, 2014), One survey of providers participating in capitated arrangements found that over half of those providers had a department dedicated to reconciling and administering risk pools and settlements. Id. The survey concluded that such risk contracts required “significant investment” in contract administration and oversight. Id. at 30.
because physicians ignore those that do not provide a hefty enough financial incentive. A survey of studies on doctors given financial incentives to increase preventive care yielded mixed results, leading to the conclusion that the incentives were not large enough to motivate the necessary provision of services. The cost of "effective" financial incentives thus counterbalances any savings that might be achieved.

In addition to lowering costs, financial incentives are purported to increase the quality of care that patients receive, though few studies provide informative findings of explicit links between the quality of care and financial incentives for providers. The studies that found financial incentives improve quality often ignore data manipulation by providers, who seemingly demonstrate high levels of success through selection bias and


12 See Robert Towns, et al., Economic Incentives and Physicians' Delivery of Preventive Care: A Systematic Review, 28 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED. 234, 234 (2005). Six studies that met the inclusion criteria were identified, which generated eight different findings. Id. The literature is sparse. Id. Of the eight financial interventions reviewed, only one led to a significantly greater provision of preventive services. Id. The lack of a significant relationship does not necessarily imply that financial incentives cannot motivate physicians to provide more preventive care. Id.

13 Petersen, supra note 11, at 270. Financial incentives may over or under reward providers. See id. at 269-70. Additionally, the design of the incentive can sometimes cause ambiguity in that the measure do not take into account factors outside the control of the incentivized party. See, e.g., Molly Doyle and Elyse Pegler, Medicare Advantage Star Ratings: Where Do We Go From Here?, HEALTH DIALOG (Sept 2010), available at http://www.healthdialog.com/Libraries/Research_Documents/Medicare_Advantage_Star_Ratings.shtml (illustrating that location of the provider as a factor outside the control of the incentivized party). "Success with a measure such as 'Ease of Getting Needed Care and Seeing Specialists' is more challenging for plans serving rural and poorer areas with fewer primary care physicians and specialists." Id. at *5. G. Flodgren, et al. An overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing healthcare professional behaviours and patient outcomes, THE COCHRANE LIBRARY, 2011, Issue 7. Art. No.: CD009255. (July 2011) (noting "[w]e found no evidence from reviews that examined the effect of financial incentives on patient outcomes"). For example, quality improvement initiatives were instituted prior to the adoption of the incentive scheme being studied. "Evidence suggests that quality for some aspects of care was already improving before 2004, and could have been approaching its achievable limit in affluent areas, which would mean that the incentive scheme was introduced at a time when inequalities had already peaked." See T. Doran, et al., Effect of financial incentives on inequalities in the delivery of primary clinical care in England: analysis of clinical activity indicators for the quality and outcomes framework, 372 LANCET 728-736 (2008). The evidence regarding quality improvements is mixed, with some studies showing financial incentives neither lower nor improve quality of care. See id.

14 Doran, supra note 14.

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15 Doran, supra note 15.

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16 See Mark Hagland,

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choosing participants who best fit the study. Additionally, patients requiring services that fall outside the clinical targets could be adversely affected if practices devote all of their efforts to meeting the goals for the target population.

While the efficacy of many of these financial incentives has been called into question generally, incentives tend to have a greater negative effect on vulnerable populations, and especially on persons with mental illness. The following sections will discuss several financial incentives often implemented to reduce costs and improve quality of care and examine the disparately negative impacts of these measures on individuals with psychiatric challenges.

A. Capitation

Though capitation payment systems have existed since the 1930s, the movement to shift the financial risk to health care clinicians is relatively new. Under traditional fee-for-service, payments are made to providers for each service provided. However, under global capitation, ACOs are paid a flat fee per patient, thus placing

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14 Doran, supra note 13, at 728-736. Providers reporting high levels of achievement create a façade of improvement. Id.

[The results assume consistent and accurate recording of activity by practices, which were given a financial incentive to report high levels of achievement. Improvements might have been stimulated by over-reporting numerators – e.g., by claiming a missed target had been achieved – or by under-reporting denominators – e.g., by inappropriately excluding difficult patients or excluding them from disease registers.

Id. At the same time, the performance based contracting system might cause some unintended provider behavior such as misreporting, which could make performance look better without actually improving the treatment quality. Y. Shen, Selection Incentives in a Performance-Based Contracting System, 38 HEALTH SERV'S RESEARCH 535, 536 (2003). A different study noted that there can be a substantial risk of bias in most studies, because many do not address the issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan. S. Sivey, et. al, The effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians, THE COCHRANE LIBRARY 20:1, Issue 9; 12 (2011).

15 Doran, supra note 13, at 735. “[T]he activities we assessed were mainly concerned with secondary prevention in people with existing chronic disease, and inequalities could have widened for activities that were not subject to an incentive, especially in practices that were devoting all their efforts to meeting the targets.” Id.

financial risk on ACOs and their providers to control costs. The shifting of financial
risk of providing care to clinicians is allegedly moderated where the clinician or ACO is
responsible for the full range of outpatient and inpatient services. The incentive,
however, is to provide just enough care to obviate the need for more costly
interventions. Capitation “essentially turns the doctor into an insurance company,
often without adequate actuarial spreading of the risk.” Therefore, the more treatment
the doctor withholds, the more money he or she earns. In terms of the ethical
implications of capitation, “large [financial] incentives may create conflicts of interest
that can in turn compromise clinical objectivity. It is unethical to do unnecessary
procedures to reap financial gain and unethical to limit medical care for financial gain.”
Financial incentives related directly to performance of processes and outcomes do not
effectively address this conflict. Ultimately, the conflict between the provider’s and the
patient’s interests

17 Id. Bundled payments and global capitation shift the financial risk of providing care to the
providers because the providers’ income is dependent upon reducing their cost to provide health
care below the capitated payment amount. Even ACOs that reimburse some of their providers
on a fee-for-service basis are able to limit care with methods formerly used by managed
organizations: financial incentives to “gatekeepers,” cash bonuses, threat of expulsion from the
network, fee “withholds,” contract limitations, the delay of authorization for treatment, and
utilization review. Russ Herman, et. al., Westlaw Database: 5 Litigating Tort Cases § 62:2, HMO
Litigation (last updated August 2013). The author has represented clients whose mental health
care providers were subjected to onerous utilization reviews, including requests for records dating
back for years, because these providers actively participated in the appeal of denial of service
authorization.

18 See Herman, supra note 17.

19 Id.

20 MYRNA C. GOLDSMITH AND MARK A. GOLDSMITH, CONTOUR VIES IN THE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE, 125, 2001.

21 Id. Because under a capitation system a doctor is paid a flat monthly payment for each patient
they see, that doctor is paid the same for a patient who requires four visits a month and a patient
who hasn’t been to the doctor in years. Id. Thus, there is a positive relationship between the
treatment the doctor withholds and the money that doctor makes. Id. While stop-loss protection
or reinsurnce may mitigate some of the danger to providers, including smaller providers, of
assuming financial risk, many may not have it. Id. See Peter S. Wehrwein, Reinsurance and Stop-Loss
survey] . . . [found] that 86 percent of primary care physicians had no reinsurability on any
capitated contract” to limit the physician’s financial exposure. Id.

22 Robert Kuttner, Must Good HMOs Go Bad? – The Search for Checks and Balances, 338 NEW ENGL.

23 See Carine Chaix-Couturier et al., Effects of Financial Incentives on Medical Practice: Results from a
Systematic Review of the Literature and Methodological Issues, 12 INT’L J. FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH
CARE 133, 136-39 (2000). Studies show that any form of capitation decreases the use of services. Id. at
139. For instance, total volume of prescriptions decreased by 0-24% and hospital days decreased

24 See L AURA THOMI PATIENT ALLIANCE - CARE: A SYSTEMATIC relationship is the be
outcomes. Id. David

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patient’s interests could negatively affect the creation and maintenance of therapeutic alliances and the efficacy of care.\textsuperscript{24}

Although capitated payment systems were discredited in the 1980s and 1990s due to their propensity to encourage the denial of medically necessary care, today’s ACOs essentially use the same payment methodology.\textsuperscript{25} Even with consumer protections, this model has proven problematic as exhibited by similar systems in Europe.\textsuperscript{26} The European experiences illustrate the underlying issue with capitation, by up to 80\% under a capitation system compared with fee-for-service. \textit{Id.} at 136-37. Little difference could be found in the outcomes of care, except with respect to elderly and poor patients, whose outcomes were better under fee-for-service. \textit{Id.} at 137. Because financial incentives create a conflict of interest between providers seeking revenue and their patients, quality, productivity, and severity of patient adjustments must be made to financial incentives. However, such adjustments can be difficult to make “and have been shown to result in increased inequities between patients.” \textit{Id.} at 139.


[While] many . . . regard transfer of financial risk to clinicians as a necessary condition for resource conservation . . . it is hardly clear that the physician’s personal remunerative interests should be the main mechanism by which this is achieved. . . . [It] is equally prudent to avoid incentives that place clinicians at such high personal risk that they must weigh their clinical decisions in terms of their own interests and needs.

\textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{26} See David Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care, 23 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 661, 681 (Aug. 1998). In the United Kingdom, for example, capitation has led to “pervasive effects” such as “underprovision of many types of valuable services” and the inappropriate shifting of work (and costs) to entities that were not part of the capitated system. \textit{Id.} The author of the article states, “Money is a significant motivator in most realms of activity and we would do well to link financial incentives more directly to our aspirations for quality improvements.” \textit{Id.} However, there is no solid research that shows that paying for quality improvements controls the deleterious effects of capitation. Experience with pay for performance is checkered at best. See Jeroen N. Struijs & Caroline A. Baan, Integrating Care through

\textit{Id.}
namely that providers have responded by cutting or reallocating care rather than by controlling care for the purpose of better outcomes.27

Specialist services, which are generally more expensive than primary care, are also negatively affected by capitation because doctors in capitated systems feel more pressure to limit referrals, sometimes even compromising patient care.28 One study that examined the practice behavior of primary care physicians indicates that the number of referrals to specialists decreased by eight percent in a physician group under a capitated payment system.29 Another experiment concluded that physicians choose significantly fewer services under capitation than under fee-for-service.30 Generally, under capitation systems, doctors discharge patients from the hospital post-surgery “quicker and sicker.”31

Bundled Payments – Lessons Learned from the Netherlands, 364 N. ENGL. J. MED. 990, 990-991 (2011) available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1011849. Additionally, from 2007 to 2010, the Dutch system experienced extreme price variations in the amount that capitated care groups were reimbursed for diabetes care bundles. Id. This persistence in price variations indicated that insurers were interpreting the Dutch Diabetes Federation Health Care Standard guidelines in ways “to stint in order to contain costs.” Id.


31 See Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Prospective Payment System and Impairment at Discharge: The "Quicker-and-Sicker" Story Revisited, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1980, 1980 (1990). In a study with a sample size of over 10,000 patients, in which the hospitals were paid a fixed amount per patient rather than being reimbursed based on the patient’s actual cost of care, the patients were repeatedly discharged sooner and in less stable condition. Id. “[O]ne (17%) of six patients was discharged

In the case of acute residential hospitalization, whil the equate to total well longer period of phy medical condition in correlation between for severely mentally were worse than the were only significant discontinued, treatr improvement.34 Any persons with severe capitation and no-ris attributable to the incentives for provid

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32 Charles A. Kiesler, PSYCHOLOGIST 349, 34
33 The study compared service (FFS) group. See Fee-for-Service Financing http://www.medscape.com
34 Id.
35 J.P. Morrissey et al., A No-Risk Medicaid Program
36 See Capitation, AM. advocacy-arc/state-adv reform/evaluating-paym physicians’ assumption:
37 Scott Gottlieb, Acon INST. FOR PUB. POLIC http://www.aei.org/file
In the case of persons with mental illness, the goal is to prevent hospitalization or acute residential care. However, for this population in particular, avoiding hospitalization, while an admirable goal if appropriately pursued, does not necessarily equate to total wellness. Delayed or denied services or tests may simply result in a longer period of physical or emotional pain and discomfort, but not a worsening of the medical condition itself. A study of six Ohio mental health centers shows a negative correlation between capitation, or capitation-like financing mechanisms, and outcomes for severely mentally ill patients. Outcomes for patients under the capitated system were worse than those within the fee-for-service group. Any improvements observed were only significant for patients in the FFS group. Once the capitated group was discontinued, treatment outcomes for severely mentally ill patients showed improvement. Another study had similar results when the health status outcomes of persons with severe mental illness in managed care organizations financed through capitation and no-risk fee-for-service were compared. These discrepancies are likely attributable to the financial risk capitation imposes on providers, which eliminates incentives for providers to promote preventive services.

In addition, capitation and similar financial incentives can also actually impede the adoption of quality improvements. For example, increasing the use of peer-run mental health alternatives/services or expanding the definition of medically necessary services to include work and supportive services will improve the quality of care. ACOs may be fearful of adopting innovative peer services until they are the routine standard of care and definitively proven to reduce cost. Some criticize ACOs generally for with at least one instability, two (39%) of five patients ... [had] at least one measure of sickness, and one (24%) of four patients had an abnormal last laboratory [test result]." Id. at 1980-81.


The study compared a Case Rate Pilot (CRP) group financed by capitation, with a fee-for-service (FFS) group. See Mina Chang, et al., The Impact of Managed Care: Comparison of Case Rate and Fee-for-Service Financing for Persons With Severe Mental Illness, MEDSCAPE (2005), available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/466934_2.

Id.

J.P. Morrissey et al., Service Use and Health Status of Persons with Severe Mental Illness in Full-Risk and No-Risk Medicaid Programs, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 293, 293-98 (2002).


restricting innovation in medicine by limiting entrepreneurial ventures.\textsuperscript{38}

Global capitation incentivizes higher patient caseloads, and as caseloads increase, the time that clinicians spend with their patients is reduced.\textsuperscript{39} The incentives inherent in prepaid plans undoubtedly result in a reduction of time spent with the patient.\textsuperscript{40} Additionally, providers are encouraged to schedule patients for returning appointments at extensive intervals, which further delays the patient’s care.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} Id.

\textsuperscript{39} See AM. MED. ASS’N supra note 36 (defining capitation). Under global capitation, physicians are paid on a per patient basis. See Hagian, supra note 16 (defining and comparing global capitation with other physician payment methods). One of the key factors in misdiagnosis and hence malpractice claims is a failure of communication. Hardeep Singh & Saul N. Weingart, Diagnostic Errors In Ambulatory Care: dimensions and preventive strategies, 14 ADVANCES IN HEALTH SCI. EDUC. 57–61 (2009) (listing “provider-patient encounter” as first “dimension[ of ambulatory care from which errors may arise”). The time pressures under which clinicians operate in ambulatory settings contribute to this communication issue because of the brevity of a physician-patient encounter in an ambulatory setting. Id. In a study that compared high-volume and low-volume physicians, “high-volume physicians had visits that were 30% shorter.” S.J. Zyzanski et al., Tradeoffs in High Volume Primary Care Practice, 46 J. FAM. PRAC. 397-02 (1998). In another study, researchers who analyzed 46,320 doctor-patient visits found that shorter visits are associated with capitation, even after controlling for HMO enrollment status, race, and location. H. Balkrishnan et al., Capitation Payment, Length of Visit, and Preventive Services, 8 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE 332-40 (2002). See also, Estrella M. Geraghty et al., Primary Care Visit Length, Quality, and Satisfaction for Standardized Patients with Depression, 22(12) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.1641-47 (2007), (practicing in an HMO was one key factor in shorter visits). If high caseloads are the norm, there is a potential for delays in care. See Zyzanski, supra (highlighting relationship between high caseloads and accompanying risk of lower-quality care). If a person must go out-of-network, that diminishes an ACO’s controls over cost, which is its primary function. See Gottlieb, supra note 37 (discussing ACOs in the context of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).

\textsuperscript{40} K.B. Wells et al., Detection of Depressive Disorder for Patients Receiving Prepaid or Fee-For-Service Care, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3298 (1989) (explaining that “[prepayment] care [patients] . . . were . . . less likely to have depression detected . . . than . . . fee-for-service [patients].”). See also Lori Melichar, The Effect of Reimbursement on Medical Decision Making: Do Physicians Alter Treatment In Response to a Managed Care Incentive, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 902 (2009).

\textsuperscript{41} D. Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996). Doctors “may schedule return appointments at intervals between appointments that are too long.” Id. at 161. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 30 (1986) (noting “negative and positive financial incentives” force a physician to “conserve referrals for consultation”). Not surprisingly, high caseloads and the concomitant lack of time to adequately provide services affects quality of care and outcomes. Frank Davidoff, Time, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 483, 483 (1997). Davidoff reports “41% of physicians . . . reported that the amount of time they spent with their patients . . . decreased.” Id.

B. Shared

\textsuperscript{42} Shorter visits with one study, high-volum one third fewer patie treatment programs w and crime outcomes. Dependence Treatment, 3 researchers linked sho note 40.

\textsuperscript{43} Mental Health Lega 2013), available at http:

\textsuperscript{44} Id.

\textsuperscript{45} Id.

\textsuperscript{46} MW.J. Doherty et : Developmental Model, 25 patients’ psychosocial. Chang, supra note 5:

\textsuperscript{48} Id.
The caseload and time impact of incentives is particularly severe for persons with behavioral health issues. For example, under revisions imposed by Massachusetts Medicaid's capitated mental health manager, the time allotted for a standard medical management visit was reduced from 30 minutes to 15 minutes. In this quarter hour, Medicaid recipients must report their current mental health status, including reactions to current medications and personal factors that might be affecting their health. They also must receive information about new medication, how to administer it and potential side effects. This obviously leaves little time for questions or for the patient and provider to develop the sort of relationship that is so important for the successful treatment of persons with psychiatric challenges.

In a capitated system, where prices for an episode of care are fixed or where a provider group is responsible for the individual's total care, providers can hold down expenses by "creaming" or "cherry-picking" patients with less severe diseases that require low-cost treatment over "high-cost" patients, in order to contain treatment costs and increase profits. Not only does capitation run the risk of compromising patient care, but it can lead to a denial of access to care because of provider incentive for pre-selection. The impact of this "cherry-picking" can be especially severe for persons with long-standing, severe mental illness whose treatment requirements are often complicated and long-term.

B. Shared Savings

Shared savings, an example of an incentive used to cut health care costs, is

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42 Shorter visits with doctors directly affects patients' health. Davidoff, supra note 41 at 483. In one study, high-volume doctors had lower up-to-date rates of preventive services, and scheduled third fewer patients for well care. Zyzanski, supra note 39. One study found that drug treatment programs with a lower ratio of counselors to clients are associated with better drug use and crime outcomes. Michael L. Pendergrass et al., Program Factors and Treatment Outcomes in Drug Dependence Treatment, 35 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1931, 1958 (2000). In yet another study, researchers linked shorter visits to lower rates of detection of depressive disorders. Wells, supra note 40.


44 Id.

45 Id.


47 Chang, supra note 33.

48 Id.
meant to ensure greater accountability by providers in the delivery of care. With this type of incentive, providers receive a percentage of the costs saved by reducing services, labs, and referrals, utilizing cheaper medical devices, and limiting the doctor’s choices for certain clinical products. This type of arrangement most commonly occurs when a target is set for spending and cost savings or overruns relative to the target are shared between the parties, e.g., physician groups and ACOs or managed care organizations and physicians. Shared savings, however, inadvertently threaten a patient's quality of care. In passing the civil monetary penalties statute for health care fraud and abuse, Congress recognized that providing incentives to reduce care was unethical and could lead to reduced quality of care.

Shared-savings incentives may have a plethora of other unintended results, such as encouraging providers to refer patients to low-cost hospitals to receive a percent of the savings or bonuses. These hospitals may or may not be proficient in the care the individual needs. Similarly, less expensive medical devices and services, which frequently are less effective or appropriate for the individual, are used in place of more expensive medical devices. Doctors have also often reported feeling that quality of care is

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Hearing on Gainsharing, supra


comprised due to these incentive systems.55

The problem of ineffective low-cost substitutes is especially notable for persons with psychiatric challenges, whose complaints of inefficacy and pain are frequently attributed to their diagnoses. The generic drug Budeprion XL, prescribed in place of the anti-depressant Wellbutrin, provides an apt example of the disparate effect low-cost substitutes can have on individuals with mental illness. The generic, approved by the FDA in 2006, was plagued by complaints. Patients stated that it was not as effective as the name brand, but the FDA ignored those complaints, likely attributing them to the normal ups and downs of depression.56 It was not until October of 2012, six years after the introduction of this generic on the market, that the FDA conceded the drug was not the bioequivalent of its name brand.57

I recall 20 years ago in this Subcommittee we examined this gain sharing. We called it “kickbacks” in those days. We decided that wasn’t such a good idea, to encourage profit sharing at the expense of beneficiaries, taxpayers, because they suffered. When the hospital prospective payment system was implemented, hospitals began enlisting physicians through incentive plans to help contain costs. But this created inducements for the docs to withhold care or create early discharge. We enacted new penalties in Title 9 of the Social Security Act. Bluntly stated, what we are going to talk about today is whether to turn back time and allow kickbacks, which will benefit nobody but either the doctor or the hospital, but saves money. The taxpayers, the beneficiaries will suffer.

56 See In re Budeprion XL Mktg. & Sales Litig., E.D. Pa., No. MDL 2107, 2010 WL 2135625. In 2009 and 2010 a series of class action complaints were brought regarding the efficacy and side effects of Budeprion XL. These cases were consolidated and heard in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. See also Meghan M. Grady & Stephen M. Stahl, A Horse of a Different Color: How Formulation Influences Medication Effects, 17 CNS SPECTRUMS 63 (2012), available at http://onlinedigitaleditions.com/article/A+Horse+Of+A+Different+Color%3A+How+Formulation+Influences+Medication+Effects/1120847/119216/article.html. Generic drugs do not always have the same properties as the name brand. Id.
C. Performance Incentives (Pay-for-Performance)

Performance incentives, or “Pay-for-Performance,” provides higher payments for the execution of certain procedures or achievement of certain outcomes, but are often problematic because of their effect on outcomes or processes that are not incentivized.\(^8\) When reimbursement requires identification of specific diagnoses, providers become too focused on identifying these conditions and ignore other disease areas for which quality is not measured. This process could result in a delayed or missed diagnosis of a disease that could have been prevented or treated earlier.\(^9\)

In the short-run, targeted outcomes like prescribing aspirin for cardiac patients may superficially improve care, but long-term overall quality of care may be negatively affected.\(^0\) One frightening study demonstrated that pay for performance “could end up widening medical disparity and ethnic minorities” serve “vulnerable pop practices.”\(^1\)

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care not associated with Performance on the Quality of corporation literature revi “reliable basis for anticip for health care quality at j et al., supra. Few studies and financial incentives it rigorous enough to draw short in duration, lacked Pay for Performance Research MED. ASS'N. 1821-23 (2014 Pay-For-Performance PRESS CORPORATION (May 4, Release). Researchers for care physicians in Mass proportion of vulnerable practices.” Id. “That diff in future pay-for-perform 6\) Jeffrey S. Berns, M.D., http://www.medscape.co thinks too much time is because they’re necessari volume, MARKETPLACE health-care/paying-docto: pneumonia, yes, you wan things is that patient can Well, how do you measur 63 Berns, supra note 62 citi for Medicare and Medicaid NEPHROL. 2296-2302 (2 2014) levels of performance in lower levels of performa: For example, Ninety per


[While the measures are broad] there are gaps in important areas of health plan performance, such as the health plan’s performance related to patients with acute, serious health care problems (which are obviously common in the Medicare population). For example, none of the measures relate to whether patients are informed about the advisability of referral outside of the MA plan’s provider network for patients with unique clinical circumstances, such as particular cancers best cared for in a specialized cancer center.


\(^10\) Pay for performance systems are flawed because there is “no consensus about the best way to design a pay for performance program.” Melony E. Sorbero, et al., Assessment of Pay for Performance Options for Medicare Physician Services: Final Report, RAND CORPORATION, xiv (May 2006), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2010/RAND_WR391.pdf. See also R.W. Bremer et al., Pay for Performance in Behavioral Health, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1419, 1427 (December 2008). One study of pay for performance with primary care providers in England found that while the payments accelerated improvements in quality for two of the three chronic conditions targeted, the rate of improvement slowed and the quality of those aspects of
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2014] JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW 187

widening medical disparities experienced by poorer people and those belonging to racial and ethnic minorities” because physicians under pay for performance programs that serve “vulnerable populations would likely receive lower payments than other practices.”

As with capitation, pay-for-performance creates an incentive to cherry-pick patients. In a performance-based system, funding is dependent on the overall performance of the provider or provider group for the year, and a set of clear indicators are used to measure the performance of the providers. As a result, doctors screen and select less severely ill patients, which adversely affects patients with more serious diagnoses. This “cherry-picking” obviously hurts the elderly and the chronically ill, but care not associated with the incentive actually declined. Campbell et al., Effects of Pay for Performance on the Quality of Primary Care in England, 361 New Eng. J. Med. 368 (2000). A RAND corporation literature review found that no literature on pay for performance programs provide a “reliable basis for anticipating [its] effects … in Medicare [on] … directing financial incentives for health care quality at physicians, physician groups, and/or physician practice sites.” Sorbero et al., supra. Few studies provide informative findings of explicit links between the quality of care and financial incentives for providers. Petersen, supra note 11, at 270. Some studies were not rigorous enough to draw definitive conclusions from because they were not generalizable, too short in duration, lacked control groups, or had too small of a sample size. R. Adams Dudley, Pay for Performance Research: How to Learn What Clinicians and Policy Makers Need to Know, 294 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1821-23 (2005).

61 Pay-For-Performance Programs May Worsen Medical Disparities in Medical Care, RAND CORPORATION (May 4, 2010), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2010/05/04.html (News Release). Researchers found that when simulating a pay for performance program on primary care physicians in Massachusetts, the “average-sized physician practices serving the highest proportion of vulnerable populations would receive about $7,100 less annually than other practices.” Id. “That difference could be even larger if greater amounts of money are put at stake in future pay-for-performance programs.” Id.

62 Jeffrey S. Berns, M.D., P-4-P and Dialysis Centers: A Look Beyond URR, (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/757433. Harvard public health professor Ashish Jha thinks too much time is spent on quality measures “just because they can be measured, not because they’re necessarily the right metrics.” Dan Gorenstein, Paying doctors for value instead of volume, MARKETPLACE HEALTH CARE (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/health-care/paying-doctors-value-instead-volume. "If you have a patient who comes in with pneumonia, yes, you want to make sure that patient doesn’t die, but one of the most important things is that patient can go back to work, play with their families and lead a meaningful life. Well, how do you measure all of that? That takes work," Jha says. Id.

63 Berns, supra note 62 citing N. Tangri et al., Both Patient and Facility Contribute to Achieving the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Pay-for-Performance Target for Dialysis Adequacy, 22 J. AM. SOC. NEPHROL. 2296-2302 (2011). Performance-based funding can either be renewed or increased if levels of performance increase, however funding can be decreased or terminated as a result of lower levels of performance. Id. Outcomes are therefore highly dependent upon patient mix. Id. For example, Ninety percent of the variability in hemodialysis units’ ability to meet quality goals
it also hurts the poor because certain cost drivers like readmission rates are related to socio-economic status. Because persons with psychiatric challenges are more likely to be poor, cherry-picking further affects this patient population.

Based on "effectiveness," "efficiency," and "special population standards," providers in one study measured their overall performance with outcome measures such as clients remaining drug free thirty days prior to termination, remaining free from arrest, maintaining employment, reducing absenteeism on the job and reducing the number of issues with their employer, spouse/significant other, and family members. This study utilized the "special population standard" in order to control for the possibility that the clinic would specifically target clients who were easier to treat. However, even with the control, the providers engaged in activities aimed at attracting less severe clients and selected less severe clients in order to improve their performance ratings for optimization of funding.

D. Alternatives to Capitation and Other Financial Incentives

Capitation and other financial incentives that encourage denial of care are hard to control through alternative incentives, like pay for performance, as these alternative incentives also have unforeseen consequences. Rather than focus on incentives that limit necessary medical care and the tools used for accurate diagnosis like MRIs, attention might be paid to alternative avenues for controlling costs, like reintroducing physical education as a daily part of school, soda and sugar taxes to discourage consumption of unhealthy foods, and exploration of alternative and up and coming modes of mental health care like mediation and Open Dialogue, which emphasizes social connection rather than medication and institutionalization.

II. Electronic Medical Reform

Electronic medical records are the federal law, and by privileging some merits, persons with adoption records because electronic records because electronically persons with psychiatric conditions are treated electronically.

69 Health Information Te 13101-13424 (2012). T hospitals adopt electroni f probe Medicare/Medicaid payn encourages the adoption for the delivery of health 224 of the Massachusetts health records to be licen.

70 See Otto F. Wahl, Men 467, 467-78 (1999). In a study of their illnesses due to asso their psychiatric status an comes from mental health study said they would not medical record. See Rens Records: Psychiatric Clinician's legislature was familiar with consequences of the rule disclosures as a matter of HIV/AIDS test results); 127.020 (D) (barring dis psychiatric diagnoses is n See, e.g., Nicole Perlotho, at B2; Patrick Ouellette, Security (April 28, 2010 learned-having-a-remedial DEPT. OF HEALTH & Ht breachnotificationrule/breach unusually attractive target personal information. Sec Tech., (Feb. 18, 2014), records-77113382628.htm compromised since 2009. 2009, eSECURITY PLA security/30-million-ameri
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II. Electronic Medical Records

Electronic medical records are often touted as being essential to health care
reform. Providers are encouraged to adopt electronic medical records by state and
federal law, and by private and public insurers.69 While electronic medical records have
some merits, persons with psychiatric challenges have a legitimate concern about their
adoption.70 Persons with psychiatric challenges are concerned about electronic health
records because electronic health records facilitate the sharing of information, and
persons with psychiatric challenges lack control over which of their health care

69 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, 42 U.S.C. §
13101-13424 (2012). The HITECH Act of 2009 essentially mandates that physicians and
hospitals adopt electronic records by 2014, or face penalties in the form of reduced
Medicare/Medicaid payments. Id. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act also
encourages the adoption of electronic health records, partially for research purposes and partially
224 of the Massachusetts Acts of 2012 requires doctors to demonstrate proficiency in electronic
70 See Otto P. Wahl, Mental Health Consumers’ Experience of Stigma, 25 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN
467, 467-78 (1999). In a survey of 1,301 mental health consumers, the majority tried to conceal
their illnesses due to associated stigma and “worried a great deal that others would find out about
their psychiatric status and treat them unfavorably.” Id. at 467. Strong verification of this point
comes from mental health clinicians themselves; the majority of those surveyed for one recent
study said they would not want their own personal psychiatric record included with their general
medical record. See Ronald M. Salomon et al., Openness of Patients’ Reporting With Use of Electronic
legislature was familiar with the social, vocational, familial, legal, physical wellness and psychiatric
consequences of the release of similar types of health care information when it barred such
disclosures as a matter of law. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70F (2012) (barring disclosure of
HIV/AIDS test results); § 70G (barring disclosure of genetic testing); 105 MASS. CODE REGS.
127.020 (D) (barring disclosure of mammogram reports). The concern of persons with
psychiatric diagnoses is not primarily about rampant security breaches, although they do exist.
See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Digital Data on Patients Raises Risk of Breaches, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011
at B2; Patrick Ouellette, Heartbleed Bug Lessons Learned: Having a Remediation Plan, HEALTH IT
learned-having-a-remediation-plan. See generally, Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S.
breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html (last visited May 29, 2014). Medical records are an
unusually attractive target of hackers, as they reap more on the Internet black market than other
personal information. See Dan Tynan, The Next Data Theft Target: Your Medical Records, YAHOO!
TECH, (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/the-next-data-theft-target-your-medical-
records-77113382628.html. The medical records of nearly 30 million Americans have been
compromised since 2009. Jeff Goldman, 30 Million Americans Affected by Medical Data Breaches Since
2009, ESECURITY PLANET (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-
providers may see their psychiatric information. Of course, the more persons with whom information is shared, the greater the likelihood of unauthorized releases of private information. The larger concern, however, is not about these illegal disclosures, but rather about disclosures permitted by state and federal law. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule provides insufficient protection of mental health information as it only prevents disclosure of psychotherapy notes without patient consent. The Privacy Rule narrowly defines psychotherapy notes as “notes recorded by a [mental health professional] documenting or analyzing the contents of conversation during a private counseling session or a group, joint, or family counseling session and that are separate from the rest of the [patient’s] medical record.” Therefore, the Privacy Rule permits disclosure to any person providing health care to a patient, without the patient’s authorization, of the following mental health information: medication prescription and monitoring, counseling session start and stop times, modalities and frequency of treatment furnished, results of clinical tests, and any summary of diagnosis, functional status, treatment plan, symptoms, prognosis, and progress to date.

Most people presume that sharing medical records will enhance quality of care. However, for persons with psychiatric diagnoses, this is often not the case. In fact, due to stigma, providers often give poorer health care to persons whom they know or infer have psychiatric diagnoses. Stigma against persons with psychiatric histories exists in the medical profession. Physicians, psychiatrists, nurses, other mental health professionals, and media stigmatizing bias. They believe that individuals who seek for symptoms. They diagnoses, believing the

Partially as a result of the relatively minor twenty-five years et die prematurely die of the predominant cause have shown that individuals present with symptoms

71 Wahl, supra note 70, at 467. Patients with psychiatric conditions may be concerned about the stigma associated with mental health conditions. Id.

72 See id.


74 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.

75 See id.


77 See Graham Thornicroft et al., Discrimination in Health Care Against People with Mental Illness, 19 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 113 (2007). “There is strong evidence that people with a diagnosis of mental illness, for example, have less access to primary health care and also receive inferior care for diabetes and heart attacks. . . .” (citations omitted). Id. at 118. See also M. Heron, et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2006, 57 NAT’L VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS (April 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvss/nvss57/nvss57_14.pdf. Life expectancy for people with major mental illness is 56 years while the “average” American life expectancy is 78 years. Id.

78 Thornicroft, supra note 77 (discussing discrimination in health care against people with mental illness).
more persons with authorized releases of professional and medical/mental health students are among those who manifest stigmatizing bias. Nurses, according to researchers, can act as "stigmatizers" because they believe that individuals with mental health issues are dangerous, weak and to blame for symptoms. They often do not respect or give credence to patients with psychiatric diagnoses, believing them to be poor historians, unreliable, and uncooperative.

Partially as a result of this stigma, persons with psychiatric histories on average die twenty-five years earlier than the general population and sixty percent of those who die prematurely die of preventable or treatable conditions. Cardiovascular disease is the predominant cause of premature death among this population, and many studies have shown that individuals with psychiatric histories tend to receive less care when they present with symptoms of cardiovascular disease. The impact of stigma on the quality


81 See id.

82 See supra note 77 (discussing life expectancy of individuals with mental illness). See generally Babak Roshanaci-Moghaddam & Wayne Katon, Premature Mortality From General Medical Illnesses Among Persons With Bipolar Disorder: A Review, 60 Psychiatric Services 147, 147-54 (2009) (discussing recent evidence which has shown an increased risk of premature mortality for bipolar patients). A study that used the Western Australian Linked Database, found that persons with mental illness have mortality rates that are 2.5 times higher than the general population. David Lawrence & Rebecca Coghlan, Health Inequalities and the Health Needs of People with Mental Illness, 131 NSW PUBLIC HEALTH BULLETIN 155 (2002).

83 See BARBARA MAUER, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS. MED. DIRS. COUNCIL, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY IN PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 4, 6-7, 11-15 (Joe Parks et al. eds. 2006). Sixty percent of premature deaths in persons with serious mental illness are due to "natural causes," the front-runner being cardiovascular disease. Id. at 4, 11-15. These persons face problems such as patient fearfulness, system fragmentation, and significantly, provider stigma, in accessing health care for treatable conditions. Id. at 6-7. In fact, persons with serious mental illness have lower rates of cardiovascular procedures compared to the general population for these reasons. Id. at 7. In one study of patients presenting with chest pain, for example, only 40% of patients with behavioral or mental health diagnosis were referred for coronary angioplasty. See Susan Jeffrey, Psychiatrists Not Immune to Mental Health Bias, MEDSCAPE (May 21, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/804499#. In addition, persons with a
of care of persons with psychiatric histories is not limited to cardiac conditions. Clinician bias against persons with mental illness often adversely affects medical management and leads to poor quality care. In order to learn more about this disparity, Massachusetts' Behavioral Health Task Force held public forums on the topic. Numerous persons with psychiatric challenges recounted their inability to get appropriate physical health care because their providers were aware of their psychiatric histories.

Reports from people with psychiatric histories on their experiences with health care providers ranged from ordinary rudeness to refusal to treat serious medical conditions ultimately confirmed as real. In the experience of people with mental serious mental illness and a cardiovascular condition receive about half the number of follow-up interventions, such as bypass surgery or cardiac catheterization, following a heart attack than do normal cardiac patients with no serious mental illness. See Juliann Garey, When Doctors Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/opinion/sunday/when-doctors-discriminate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

84 See, e.g., MAUER, supra note 83, at 24 (explaining diabetics with mental disorders do not receive standard of care diabetic monitoring).
85 See Jeffrey Jackson & Kurt Kroenke, Difficult Patient Encounters in the Ambulatory Clinic: Clinical Predictors and Outcomes, 159 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1069, 1072-73 (1999); Mark Graber et al., Effect of a Patient's Psychiatric History on Physicians' Estimation of Probability of Disease, 15 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 294 (2000); Lawrence, supra note 82, at 157. Mental disorder is a predictor of patient encounters being perceived as "difficult" by clinicians, and this perception has negative care consequences. Jackson, supra, at 1069, 1072. One survey of 300 family physicians determined that "past psychiatric history influences physicians' estimation of disease presence and willingness to order tests." Graber, supra. Recognizing that stigma is one root of the "difficulty" problem, it has been argued that "it is possible that difficulty could be reduced by recognizing and treating mental disorders and by improving physician skills or attitudes toward addressing psychosocial problems or patient's serious illness concerns." Jackson, supra, at 1073.
87 See BEHAVIORAL HEALTH INTEGRATION TASK FORCE, supra note 86, at 82, 85-86 (summarizing comments regarding privacy of mental health electronic medical records).
88 See generally Peter Byrne, Stigma of Mental Illness and Ways of Diminishing It, 6 ADVANCES IN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 65 (2000) (stating "[n]y list of stigmatizers includes . . . health care professionals."). Byrne also notes a study showing that psychiatrists themselves are not immune to prejudice based on a mental health diagnosis, as evidenced by increased value judgments and diagnostic differences once a person had been labeled with a particular mental health diagnosis. Id. at 68-69.
89 See e.g., E. Koranyi, A Population, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 43% suffered from at least undiagnosed by the referrer the media was awful. They would: complaint: they had. I practitioners "may regard
91 In one study, approx 33% physical illness requiring t of which either caused mental illness Manifesting . One hundred patients with illnesses that might have suffered from physical, n physical, medical illness symptoms. Id. An additi undiagnosed physical, m symptoms. Id. See also, J ANN. EMERGENCY MED. emergency department f. identified. Id. See also R. Unrecognized Delirium, 103 psychiatric rather than me
health diagnoses, some clinicians incorrectly attribute physical symptoms to psychiatric conditions because they tend to generalize negatively about the capacity of people with mental illness to describe physical symptoms reliably.89 One article notes people with mental illness:

reported professionals as being dismissive or assuming that physical presentations were “all in the mind”. This can result in reluctance to return for further visits, which can have a detrimental effect on physical health. This is especially significant, as evidence suggests people with mental illness are at greater risk from physical health problems, including cardiovascular disease, diabetes, obesity and respiratory disease.89

Several studies also demonstrate the prevalence of this failure to appropriately treat persons with mental illness.91 One study of 1,953 patients reviewed inappropriate admissions to psychiatric facilities where physical diagnoses were missed. The vast

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89 See e.g., E. Koranyi, Morbidity and Rate of Undiagnosed Physical Illnesses in a Psychiatric Clinic Population, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 414-19 (1979). In a study of 2,090 psychiatric patients, 43% suffered from at least one major medical illness, of which, almost half or 46% remained undiagnosed by the referring physician. Id. See also Wahl, supra note 70. One interviewee commented on her medical school experience: “The treatment of psych patients in all rotations was awful. They would laugh at them, poke fun at them on rounds, disbelieve any physical complaint they had.” Id. See also, Lawrence, supra note 82, at 157 (noting mental health practitioners “may regard complaints of physical illness as psychosomatic.”)


91 In one study, approximately 80% of persons brought to a psychiatric research ward had physical illness requiring treatment that had been undiagnosed by their physicians, more than half of which either caused or greatly exacerbated these patients’ psychiatric conditions. R. Hall, Physical Illness Manifesting as Psychiatric Disease, 37 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 989-95 (Sept. 1980). One hundred patients were intensively evaluated for the presence of unrecognized medical illnesses that might have affected their hospitalization. Id. Forty-six percent of these patients suffered from physical, medical illnesses previously undiagnosed by their physician and which physical, medical illnesses either directly caused or greatly exacerbated their psychiatric symptoms. Id. An additional 34% of patients were found to be suffering from at least one other undiagnosed physical, medical illness requiring treatment though unrelated to their psychiatric symptoms. Id. See also, J.E. Tintinalli, et al., Emergency Medical Evaluation of Psychiatric Patients, 23 ANN. EMERGENCY MED., 859, 859-62 (1994). Eighty percent of those “medically cleared” by emergency department for psychiatric hospitalization an illness should have had a physical illness identified. Id. See also R.R. Reeves et al., Inappropriate Psychiatric Admission of Elderly Patients with Unrecognized Delirium, 103 SOUTHERN MEDICAL JOURNAL, 111-15 (2010) (finding patients in psychiatric rather than medical units less likely to undergo full diagnostic assessment).
majority of patients inappropriately admitted (85%) already had mental illness documented in their medical records. The researchers concluded:

... the results presented here raise concerns as to whether, in some scenarios, patients with a known history of mental illness receive the medical assessment and treatment they need, or if, in some cases, their physical symptoms are misattributed to their mental illness.

Another study confirmed that documentation of a past psychiatric diagnosis contributes to an incorrect diagnosis of delirium, which often is due to such factors as a severe or chronic medical illness, medication, infection, surgery, or drug or alcohol abuse. Veteran's Administration doctors who were presented identical vignettes, the only difference being that one person had stable schizophrenia, were less likely to refer the person with schizophrenia for either weight management or a sleep study, though both were indicated.

Further, undue disclosure of psychiatric information can lead to negative public health consequences, including the avoidance of necessary care and the undermining of research results intended to develop treatment and design best practices.

Accurate and complete information cannot be obtained by force. We know from the California HealthCare Foundation's National Consumer

92 Roy R. Reeves et al., "Unrecognized physical illness prompting psychiatric admission," 22 ANNALS OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 180, 184 (2010), available at https://www.aacp.com/pdfs%2FOS10%2FF0810ACP_Reeves.pdf (concluding physical symptoms of patient with mental-illness history are more likely attributed to psychiatric-illness).

93 Id.

94 Yasuhiro Kishi et al., "Delirium: Patient Characteristics that Predict a Missed Diagnosis at Psychiatric Consultation," 29 GEN. HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRY 442 (2007). Past psychiatric diagnosis and pain contributed to missed diagnosis of delirium in 46% of psychiatric consultations. Id.


97 "Ensure "Meaningful Use" to http://www.privacy-information.org/articles/e th inform.

98 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.5(f) psychotherapy notes. Id. the level of errors in electronic Records' Risks Emerge http://www.bloomberg.com blamed-on-systems.html (2010 and 2011). See also T Electronic Medical Record http://www.sciencemag medical-records/ (warnin Pennsylvania created a m: system has uncovered the incorrect prescriptions. Id. Repository, 12 BMC Med collected “best possible” n clinicinly significant). Wh severe mental health note providers have the option Doctors' Notes on Mental http://www.bostonglobe.m ental-health-providers-sh story.html. See also OPEN
Health Privacy Survey of November 9, 2005 that 1/8 patients or 12.5% of the population avoids their regular doctor, asks doctors to alter diagnoses, pays privately for a test, or avoids tests altogether. If we do not restore patient control over [protected health information], we can expect electronic health data to have error and omission rates of up to 12.5%. The breakthroughs and benefits possible with technology-enhanced research will never be replaced with such a high rate of errors and omissions.97

Another concern is that erroneous and stigmatizing information can be rapidly distributed. Because diagnoses and medications are not protected from other providers, this information may be peppered throughout one's medical records, even when erroneous, outdated, or irrelevant to the presenting issue or particular provider. In addition, state and federal law unfortunately impedes the ability of persons with psychiatric histories to correct errors by permitting providers to limit patient access to certain mental health records.98

97 Emphasize “Meaningful Use” by Giving Consumers Control, CONSUMER ACTION (June 2009), http://www.privacy-information.org/articles/ensure_meaningful_use_by_giving_consumers_control_over_their_health_information.


Pennsylvania created a mandatory reporting system for all medical errors in June 2004. This system has uncovered thousands of e-record problems—from misreported laboratory tests to incorrect prescriptions. Id. See also, Price et al., Assessing Accuracy of an Electronic Provincial Medication Repository, 12 BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 42 (2012) (84% of pharmacist collected “best possible” medication histories has at least one error, 48% of which were deemed clinically significant). While some providers participate in pilot projects which electronically share mental health notes with patients, participation of providers is voluntary and mental health providers have the option to lock portions of their notes from patient view. Liz Kowalezyk, Doctors’ Notes on Mental Health Shared with Patients, Boston Globe, April 8, 2014, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2014/04/07/beth-israel-deaconess-mental-health-providers-share-visit-notes-with-patients/2nVs4SSYCh2AblejgbCYK/story.html. See also OPEN NOTES, www.myopennotes.org (last visited May 29, 2014).
Electronic medical records do not necessarily improve health care.99 Because electronic medical records often result in the storage of inaccurate, incomplete and outdated information, patients must be able to retain control over providers’ access to their mental health information, including psychiatric diagnoses, discharge summaries, psychiatric medication lists and psychiatrist/psychotherapist progress notes.100 Indeed, given the high number share is problematic, where patient can’t in treatment that include trust and open comt requires just such res duty to disclose paier such disclosure shou regarding his or her

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100 See Alex Nixon, Errors in Default Settings of Electronic Medical Records Systems Raise Risks for Patients, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Sept. 6, 2013, available at http://triblive.com/business/headlines/4654582-74/errors-patient-patients%20zzz30PH2Zldz (reporting errors in medical records). The Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority, a state agency that researches health care quality, found more than 300 instances of medication errors at hospitals across Pennsylvania over the last 10 years because computers did not have the correct settings. Id. See also James Ritchie, Report Shows Serious Errors Resulting from Electronic Medical Records, CINCINNATI BUSINESS JOURNAL, Apr. 8, 2013, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/blog/2013/04/report-shows-serious-errors-resulting.html (reporting results of survey). In all, the nonprofit ECRI Institute learned of 171 health care IT mix-ups that led to or could have led to harm at 36 hospitals that volunteered for the study. Id. The project lasted just nine weeks. Id. See also Richard FitzGerald, Medication Errors: The Importance of an Accurate Drug History, 67 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 671, 673 (2009) (finding inaccuracies in documentation of pharmacological histories in general records). A review of recent studies found 10-51% of medication lists were erroneous by omission and 13-22% had errors by commission. Id. Physicians and other health care providers must check those lists with patients and pharmacists for accuracy. Id. at 673-74. A study of records in the Veterans Health Administration’s EHR system found that 84 percent of progress notes contained at least one documentation error, with an average of 7.8 documentation errors per patient. C.R. Weir, et al., Direct Text Entry in Electronic Progress Notes: An Evaluation of
health care. Because curate, incomplete and ver providers' access to s, discharge summaries, progress notes. Indeed,

Input Error, 42 METHODS OF INFO. IN MED. 61 (2003).

103 See Sarah W. Wattenberg, Frequently Asked Questions: Applying the Substance Abuse Confidentiality Regulations to Health Information Exchange, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, U.S. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 1, 13, available at http://www.samhsa.gov/healthprivacy/docs/ehr-faqs.pdf (describing “break the glass” provision whereby physician overrides patient consent requirement to access medical records). Such exceptional circumstances might include “the emergency room scenario” in which an unconscious patient suddenly arrives. Id. Where the patient is unable to communicate and has a condition that puts her life in imminent danger, the principle of patient control over the confidentiality of her medical health records is commonly overridden with a “break the glass” exception. Id.

102 See Wendy Levinson, et al., Developing Physician Communication Skills for Patient-Centered Care, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1310-18 (2010). Patient-centered care is “characterized by continuous healing relationships, shared understanding, emotional support, trust, patient enablement and activation, and informed choices. Communication skills are a fundamental component of this approach to care.” Id. at 1311.

101 See The Physician’s Role in Medication Reconciliation: Issues, Strategies and Safety Principles, AM. MED. ASSN., http://bcpsqc.ca/documents/2012/09/AMA-The-physician%E2%80%99s-role-in-Medication-Reconciliation.pdf (last visited May 18, 2014). The American Medical Association recognizes patient reluctance to disclose certain medications and suggests reassuring patients that only other health care providers will be notified of the information. Id. However, for the reasons noted above, it may be precisely these other providers that the patient is concerned about. Person-centered care requires a paradigm shift to a “culture of custodianship” of records. Talya Miron-Shatz, et al., To Serve and Protect? Electronic Health Records Pose Challenges for Privacy, Autonomy and Person-Centered Medicine, 1 INT’L J. PERS. CENTERED MED. 405, 407 (2011).

... while health systems hold confidential information about patients, it is not the system’s right to use this information as it chooses. Rather, the system needs to secure patients’ consent to transfer records or data to a third party, even if it is another medical caretaker. One recommendation we adopt from the custodianship approach is that patients should have the ability to control the flow of their clinical data and to grant access to it.

Id. (emphasis added). But see, Nicholas Bakalar, Sharing Psychiatric Records Helps Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at D6. The article creates the false impression that record sharing between behavioral and non-behavioral doctors leads to better patient outcomes. Id. Review of the
technology systems can provide the levels of granularity required to segregate psychiatric information from the rest of one’s medical record.104

Doctors often cite concerns about medication interactions in justifying unrestricted access to medical records.105 Prescribers therefore want access to their patients’ full medication lists. Of course, the utility of these lists is questionable given underlying report does not support this premise. Among other things, the study, which was based on a very limited sample size, looked at readmissions, which other studies have questioned as a reliable indicator of quality of care. Id. Over a 30-day period, the length of stay was virtually identical between those facilities that shared records and those that did not. Id. The authors of the study itself state that further research is necessary to come to a definitive conclusion, including an analysis of the participants’ race, ethnicity, and income, and that other factors not directly controlled in the study, such as social support and availability of local follow-up care, which may affect readmission rates. Id.


For our purposes, the term “granularity” means “the extent to which smaller elements of a larger dataset may be retrieved or withheld without accessing other information from an individual record or the larger data set”. The technology already exists to permit varying levels of access to information in electronic medical records. Indivo and Microsoft Health Vault are just a few examples of programs with this capacity.

Id. at 6. “In the past, patients exercised some degree of granularity just by going outside an insurer’s network to avoid the stigma of mental illness or the sharing of “embarrassing” test results.” Id. at 6 n.20. See, e.g., Adida, et al., Indico X: Developing a Fully Substitutable Personally Controlled Health Record Platform, AMIA Symposium Proceedings, 9 (2010) http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3041305/pdf/amia-2010_sympproc_0006.pdf (last visited May 18, 2014). The symposium paper details various features of the health record platform, including access authorization and ability to customize the application with relative ease. Programs also allow records to be audited to track unauthorized access to behavioral health information. HEALTHVAULT, http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/healthvault/ (last visited May 18, 2014). “It’s your HealthVault account. You decide who can see, use, add, and share info, and which health apps have access to it.” Id. The technical capacity exists to give patients control over which providers see their records. See, e.g., Melissa Chase, Multi-Authority Attribute Based Encryption, in THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY 515-534 (Vadhan ed. 2007); Arpana Mahajan & Yash Patel, Enhancing PHR Services in Cloud Computing: Patient-centric and Fine Grained Data Access Using ABE, 2 J. COMPUTER Sci. INFORMATION TECH. & SECURITY 1130 (Dec. 2012).


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their error rates.106 Even if one concedes the need for this information, use of existing databases that flag the possibility of such interactions obviate the need to see the full medication list to check for conflicts.107 Now, as electronic medical record systems are being modified to accommodate capitated payment programs and associated quality requirements, is the time to incorporate software that provides a warning message to any provider when she types in the medication she wishes to prescribe or fill. There are many common software programs that can currently check for drug interactions by typing in the patient’s name and the medication to be prescribed.108

More importantly, a computerized warning would compel the doctor to check in with her patient. That conversation could begin as follows: “I see that there is information here that I am not privy to, and while that is your choice, this is why I feel that I need this information today in order to help you make the best treatment decisions.” This would require providers to ask their patients for consent when they feel access to mental health information is necessary for optimal treatment, providing an important opportunity for discussion between the provider and patient – with the provider explaining why consent would benefit the patient and the consumer using the opportunity to express her privacy concerns as they relate to her treatment.

To protect the confidentiality of mental health records, separate signed releases should be required from any health care providers wishing to access a person’s mental health information, with few exceptions. Persons with psychiatric histories are all too familiar with the repercussions of being told that physical ailments are “all in the head,” from a diagnosis of anxiety when presenting with the rapid breathing of anaphylactic shock to the fatal diagnosis of depression when presenting with the fatigue of congestive heart. Persons with psychiatric histories and their advocates should be closely involved in developing privacy policies. While we look forward to a day when stigma against persons with psychiatric challenges disappears, just as affirmative action laws were (and are) necessary to combat existing racial and gender discrimination, the physical health of

106 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (detailing the likelihood of errors contained in electronic health records).
107 See infra note 108 (showing websites that can be used to check for conflicts).
persons with psychiatric challenges must be protected by statutory and regulatory assurances that their psychiatric information will not be shared without their consent.

Choice and for Equality

Miriam Ruttenberg

Introduction

Achieving and essential health direction of allowing solution to the prob. concerns of people health consumers.

* Miriam Ruttenberg is a state agency within panelist at the Journal entitled Mental Health.

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